First, let's look to some of the statements presented in defense of The Honorable Judge Soto.
1. Our very own Nando:
Let me quote to you the words of Antonin Scalia from the 2002 decision Republican Party of Minnesota vs. White:
In fact, however, the judges of inferior courts often "make law," since the precedent of the highest court does not cover every situation, and not every case is reviewed.
How is what he said so very different from what Sotomayor said?
Here Nando is being lazy. I suspect he is just repeating "research" from lefty websites and repeating them as gospel truth. The case Nando cites, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, dealt with a First Amendment case in which state judges in Minnesota were elected by popular vote but were nevertheless forbidden from discussing certain topics during their election campaign. SCOUTS ruled that this restriction was a violation of the First Amendment. So this case dealt with STATE JUDGES, not federal ones, and didn't even deal with judicial activism as a core issue. Nevertheless:
(a) Scalia is a federalist. It is an entirely consistent federalist position for Scalia, or anyone else for that matter, to admit that Minnesota state judges are little activist hellraisers, as a statement of fact and not of approval, yet still decry judicial activism on the federal bench.
(b) But that isn't even what Scalia is saying in this case. This quote, found in a footnote buried at the bottom of his opinion (I'm a little weirded out that this particular Scalia quote was so readily available to you), was part of Scalia's response to Stevens' and Ginsburg's dissent on the case. Here is the entire footnote (you'll have to read the opinion yourself to understand the terms):
12. Although Justice Stevens at times appears to agree with Justice Ginsburg’s premise that the judiciary is completely separated from the enterprise of representative government, post, at 3 (“[E]very good judge is fully aware of the distinction between the law and a personal point of view”), he eventually appears to concede that the separation does not hold true for many judges who sit on courts of last resort, post, at 3 (“If he is not a judge on the highest court in the State, he has an obligation to follow the precedent of that court, not his personal views or public opinion polls”); post, at 3, n. 2. Even if the policy making capacity of judges were limited to courts of last resort, that would only prove that the announce clause fails strict scrutiny. “[I]f announcing one’s views in the context of a campaign for the State Supreme Court might be” protected speech, post, at 3, n. 2, then–even if announcing one’s views in the context of a campaign for a lower court were not protected speech, ibid.–the announce clause would not be narrowly tailored, since it applies to high- and low-court candidates alike. In fact, however, the judges of inferior courts often “make law,” since the precedent of the highest court does not cover every situation, and not every case is reviewed. Justice Stevens has repeatedly expressed the view that a settled course of lower court opinions binds the highest court. See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 74 (1990) (concurring opinion); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 376—377 (1987) (dissenting opinion).
Instead, Scalia is pointing out the inconsistent position of Stevens and Ginsburg. That is the point of his footnote.
(c) Finally I think everyone would admit, even Scalia, that judges should, on occasion, "make law"; for instance, I don't think anyone has a serious problem with judges ruling that Internet communications are also protected by the First Amendment, even though the Founding Fathers had no conception of the Internet when they wrote the Constitution. That is because this "making law" is consistent with well-established principles and the original intent of the Constitution. What we conservatives decry as judicial activism is when judges "make law" based more on their own opinion, or on "changing standards of the times", or on "international opinion", rather than on well-established principles or original Constitutional intent. That's the real odious part. So the "lawmaking" that a federalist, strict constructionist judge like Scalia would make is a lot different than the "lawmaking" that a liberal "living Constitution" judge would make. So how is this relevant in Soto's case? Well, she certainly admits that the Court of Appeals "is where policy is made" even if she later giggles and feigns not advocating it. But what is the policy that she would make? Would it be original-intent policy, or would it be policy based on "changing standards of the times"? Considering that Soto was nominated by a liberal president, I'm not hopeful on the former.
2. On Soto's much-quoted "wise Latina" comment, defended by our own Jim Dandy:
..when you place it in the context of what was being discussed:
Race and Sex Discrimination cases!
There is no question that a Justice who is a woman and a minority would have a different perspective on cases where Race and Sex Discrimnation is involved, would be able to understand the issues better, and therefore be more equipped to render a better conclusion.
Different perspective? Sure. But how would this different perspective lead to a better conclusion on any case, even on a race or sex discrimination case? After all, if she's doing the things that all good non-activist judges are supposed to do - follow original intent, follow legislative intent, follow stare decisis - then who cares what kind of experiences she's had? All that really matters is her knowledge of the law. Which leads me to the next point...
3. On Soto's record, presented by BWall:
Sotomayor is anything but a flaming liberal based on the opinions that I have read: she favors judicial restraint in policy-making, has not ruled to extend rights beyond their constitutional basis, and favors consensus with conservative colleagues...
So according to BWall, she's the model jurist. (More on this later.) But to the extent liberals believe this, it stands in direct conflict with the intent of her "wise Latina" comment. Exactly what part of "judicial restraint" means that "wise Latinas" get to make better decisions than white males on sex discrimination cases? It doesn't. A person who truly favored "judicial restraint" would be the first one to lambast her for her "wise Latina" comment.
Which leads me to conclude that liberals are trying to pull a fast one here. They are trying to persuade us that it's possible to have a judge who is not a judicial activist, yet still agrees with the core ideas of identity politics. Identity politics, by its very nature, is a corruption of justice; it suggests that there should be different standards for different individuals depending on race or sex. If a judge hears a case on sex discrimination, the race or sex of the judge shouldn't make one whit's difference because justice is blind. The identity politician, on the other hand, would say that the "better decision" - or really, the only valid decision - can be reached if it is decided by a judge belonging to the same victim class as the oppressed. Why? Because, according to the identity politician, justice should not be blind - the scales of justice should be tipped towards the oppressed merely because the judge and oppressed share some common heritage.
So, libs, pick one: either she's a judicial activist who decides cases "wisely" based on her membership in the Coalition of the Oppressed, or she's a model judge who eschews such nonsense. But you can't have it both ways.
4. Her real record: It is true that there isn't a whole lot of controversial stuff, because mostly what appeals judges do is hear cases from death row inmates or illegal immgrants being deported. But there are still causes for concern.
(a) Blackman vs. NYC Transit Authority - in this case, Blackman worked for the transit authority and made threatening statements against his supervisors while on the job, for which he was fired. Blackman took it to court, claiming it violated his free speech rights. And Soto's court agreed with him. Oh, did I mention that Blackman also just happened to be the president of the local union chapter representing the transit authority workers? Soto certainly took notice:
Blackman was an active union member, and a vocal advocate on a variety of issues, including workplace safety. He was, at the time of his December 4 and March 1 comments, the elected local Union Chairman. His violent comments can be viewed against the context of his struggles and frustrations with Transit Authority supervision over these and other concerns — concerns which transcend his own personal interests. It would not be impossible, therefore, to take Blackman’s March 1, 2004 comments as having, to some extent, touched on matters of public concern.
So here we see Soto's "wise Latina" side emerging: because Blackman's just a frustrated union leader working selflessly on behalf of his union brethren, so his violent threats against a supervisor ("I have a .38 and I'm not leaving") can be excused. Soto sides with the stereotypical "oppressed", e.g. labor, against the stereotypical "oppressors", e.g., management.
(b) Boykin v. KeyCorp: In this case, Boykin, a black woman living in Georgia, tried to get a home equity loan on a house that she owned, and rented out, in Buffalo. KeyCorp turned down her application because she didn't really live in Buffalo. Boykin sued, alleging it was really because she was the victim of discrimination. The circuit judge dismissed her case, but Judge Soto reversed the decision. Why? For a bunch of reasons: because the rules about filing deadlines are vague and contradictory, Boykin didn't really miss the deadline so she should be given the benefit of the doubt; because, even though Boykin couldn't point to an affirmative act of discrimination on the part of KeyCorp, since Boykin's a pro se petitioner, she should be given the benefit of the doubt. Judge Soto bends over backwards giving Boykin the benefit of the doubt here. Here we see more "wise Latina"-ism: using more judicial contortions to give the "oppressed" a "fighting chance" to have her case heard.
(c) Ricci v. DeStefano: The famous Connecticut firefighters case. Really, the most obnoxious thing about this case is how brief the opinion is. Just one paragraph. If I wasn't as cynical, I might conclude that the judges here simply didn't want to get involved in this case, knowing that either way it would be appealed to SCOTUS. But the fact that there's a pattern of wise-Latina-ism, plus the fact that Title VII does not permit racial discrimination as a remedy to avoid a discrimination claim (such as invalidating test scores in a racially motivated manner), gives me reason to discount the otherwise inoffensive reason.
So, based on these reasons, I'm not inclined to believe that she's going to be one of those staid, judicially restrained judges. Instead I think she really meant it when she said that she thinks her activist decisions are better because she has a better grasp of the experiences associated with membership in the Coalition of the Oppressed.
5. Is she a racist? I think it would be racist for her to claim that her race gives her an edge over everyone else simply because of her race. Her "wise Latina" comment comes dangerously close to making this claim.
6. Does her membership in La Raza matter? I don't think so; like what others have said, it may have started off as a Southwestern liberation front, but nowadays I think it is more of a leftist civil rights group. Of course, it is amusing to note the double standard: liberals never have to explain away their associations with groups or individuals that, in the past, have been hotbeds of radical extremism (Obama-Ayers, anyone?) - it's only conservatives who must atone for their sins if they were ever a member of, say, a secessionist group.